Governance

GVO Governance should be agile and responsive, however, at the same time tempered and deliberative. Important community decisions are being made on a week-to-week basis, and through non-binding community polls on Discord, followed by a more detailed Forum Proposal and final voting on Snapshot. GVO can be governed, maintained, and built by a combination of community members, core contributors, and several elected committees and councils that are voted. DAOhaus is where we as a community can create proposals, and others can vote on them.

GVO will transform the ownership structure of its platform by issuing “curatorial tokens” to each of its participants—artists, collectors, and curators. Those who receive the tokens are members of the GVO Mint Pass DAO. The token holders include those active on the LiveTheLifeTV Discord Server before 2022 and the developers and original investors. The DAO Mint Pass will govern the platform, effectively turning LiveTheLifeTV into a network of galleries governed by the community. The initiative will allow third-party galleries “run their own businesses on LTL". This will allow us to get out of the driver’s seat ourselves as founders with the curation of the art and artists and really turn this into a kind of community-led, community-curated market. The idea is to align the interests of the platform with the interests of the artists and collectors.

Inspiration

An interesting section about the DAO structure at the MeeBitsDAO (watch video) (szns)

Synthetix - Governance

The Governance at SNX is brilliant but overly complex IMHO.

The original version of Compound Governor, Governor Alpha, was set up as an immutable contract. Governor Bravo is an upgraded version of the contract allowing for upgrades and changes to the governance parameters without migrating. Compound and a few other protocols have elected to use Bravo for greater convenience.

compound-protocol/contracts/Governance at master · compound-finance/compound-protocolGitHub

The Compound Governace Contracts could be considered as an industry standard, for good reason.

GitHub - Moloch-Mystics/Baal: Baal sets the season, and gives forth His voice from the clouds.GitHub

It's not a secret we have been DAOhaus Maxis the best few years. We are especially bullish about the Moloch V3 Model

Sub DAOs

DAOs are billed as community-owned orgs. Token holders have ultimate say and power over protocol mechanics, treasury, and growth. For the most part, token holders delegate the execution of these responsibilities downstream to working groups and contributors. Yearn, Index Coop, ENS, Synthetix, MakerDAO, etc. all follow this model.

Contributors are empowered by token holders. This creates a dual-class structure in DAOs. Managers and workers. Token holders are managers, contributors are workers. Ideally, these two parties have a healthy tension, but they have different incentives: Managers keep DAO spending manageable and Workers build context to make granular decisions to promote the long-term success of the DAO.

It's intuitive that this will inevitably create conflict that can cause a DAO to stall as valuable contributors leave when token-holders rug pull mandates/funding.

One possible model is a dual governance structure: One is run by token holders that have basic controls over protocol parameters (fee switch) and the other is run by contributors through some NFT/rep-based governance for basically everything else. Contributor governance basically has the power to manage everything that builds off the protocol: the workstreams. These decisions require high context and shouldn't be beholden to a managing class with zero context. You wouldn’t want a pack of rabid degens that ape in on anything that remotely smells of money, telling a potentially talented group of developers what they want, when, and how, just for the sake of ensuring they can get paid on the pump and leave on the dump.

There are gaps: Who controls the treasury? Balance of powers between token holder vs contributor governance? How are contributors held accountable?

Orca Pods

Creating A PodOrca Protocol Documentation

For the hybrid approach, Orca has been working on a concept we have been wanting to see come to life for years: subDAOs (pods)

Boardroom

Introducing the Governors Dashboard

Boardroom

We're very sensitive to UI/UX and IMHO boardroom is by far the best solution for DAO discovery. A superb governance platform tbh

Add a DAOBoardroom Docs

LFG

1/ Management

• DAOhaus (Moloch V3), Governor Bravo or Orca Protocol: organized around small working groups, called Pods. On Orca, each Pod within the DAO has its own Gnosis Safe. Access to that safe is token-gated through a membership NFT, which acts as an access “keycard.” SDK

2/ The Ballot Box

• Snapshot / BoardRoom (docs)

3/ The Treasury

• Gnosis Safe with SafeSnap (& ApeSafe)

4/ Social Governance

If we see Discord as an “Agora,” how can DAO members turn discussions into actionable insights? Protocols like DeWork are trying to crack the Admin/HR dilemma, and others like Guild.xyz are trying to make community management more efficient.